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APPROVING EMPLOYEE RETENTION AND SEVERANCE PROGRAMS: 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION RUN AMUCK? 
A. MECHELE DICKERSON• 
INTRODUCTION 
Because of recent chapter 11 mega-filings, Congress recently considered when 
(if ever) bankruptcy courts should be allowed to approve employee retention or 
severance programs. These programs are increasingly controversial because 
approving them creates the perception that bankruptcy courts condone a debtor's 
desire to give highly paid executives bonuses, while simultaneously laying off 
lower-level workers. Since lower-paid employees frequently are not covered by 
these bonus programs and often are terminated during the corporate restructuring, 1 
Congress seemed poised to eliminate this perception of inequitable treatment. 
This Essay considers when (or whether) it is appropriate for courts to approve a 
debtor's request to adopt an employee retention or severance program. Specifically, 
the Essay considers whether courts are given too much discretion when deciding to 
approve these programs and whether the appearance that highly paid employees are 
allowed to profit from a chapter 11 reorganization justifies preventing courts from 
approving payments that might help· facilitate a successful chapter 11 proceeding. 
While the enormous amount of payments involved in some recent highly publicized 
mega-cases2 mandates that courts approve plans in a way that is both rational and 
transparent, this Essay argues that courts' discretion generally should not be 
constrained. Instead, courts asked to approve these programs should continue to be 
guided by one factor: whether making the payments is necessary to help the debtor 
• Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. An earlier, shorter version of this Essay was presented 
on October I, 2002, at the 76th Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. The 
author is grateful to the thorough, diligent and dedicated research assistance provided by Angela M. Montag 
and OJ. Reynolds. This Essay was supported, in part, by a grant provided by the William & Mary Law 
School. 
1 See Nancy Rivera Brooks, Enron Execs Were Paid to Remain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, § 3 (Business), 
at 3 (contrasting average $110,000 retention bonus given to Enron executives to average $4,500 severance 
pal for lower-level workers). · 
See Bethlehem Asks to Give $9 Million in Bonuses; Bankruptcy Judge Gets Plan, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Dec. 29, 2001, at Cl [hereinafter Bethlehem Asks to Give] (reporting Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
submitted plan to allocate $8 million to 87 employees, and another $1 million to CEO RobertS. Miller, Jr.); 
Ann Davis, Want Some Extra Cash? File for Chapter 11: 'Pay-to-Stay' Bonuses are Common at Busted Tech 
Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2001, at Cl (reporting trend of retention bonuses paid to executives has 
increased due to wave oftelecom bankruptcies); Enron Asks Court for Another Round of Retention Bonuses, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. I, 2002, at C6 (reporting Enron petitioned court to approve third round of bonuses worth 
$125 million to key employees); Nelson D. Schwartz et al., Greed-Mart: Attention, Kmart Investors. The 
Company May Be Bankrupt, but Its Top Brass Have Been Raking It In, FORTUNE, Oct. 14, 2002, at 139 
(reporting Kmart's use of over $3 million in "inducement payments" and incentives to top executives); Jeff 
St. Onge, Bankruptcy Judge Oks WorldCom Bonuses: $25 Million Intended to Help Retain Key Staff, THE 
RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Oct. 30, 2002, at B I (reporting bankruptcy judge approved $25 million in 
retention bonuses for WorldCom key executives over objections of creditors). 
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achieve a successful reorganization or efficient liquidation. If that answer is yes, 
then courts largely should be allowed to ignore the "appearance" that the program 
favors certain employees. 
Part I of the Essay discusses employee retention and severance programs in 
general. This Part suggests that, given the prevalence and general acceptance of 
these benefit plans outside of bankruptcy, there is nothing per se inappropriate 
about a chapter 11 debtor's request to provide retention or severance payments to its 
employees. Part II then describes the authority bankruptcy courts have when 
deciding whether to approve a debtor's request to implement a post-petition 
retention or severance program. In general, courts will approve a debtor's request to 
implement these bonus programs as long as the court concludes that the overall 
program is reasonable and that the debtor exercised proper business judgment in 
formulating the program. This Part then presents arguments typically advanced in 
support of, and in opposition to, the implementation of these programs and 
concludes by demonstrating that courts appear to have reached a general consensus 
when deciding which factors warrant the approval of these programs. 
Congress recently proposed legislation designed to curtail the discretion of 
courts to approve post-petition retention and severance programs. Part III briefly 
discusses this legislation and other recent legislative attempts to curb judicial 
discretion. I suggest that judicial discretion arguably should be curbed when courts 
either have reached inconsistent, unpredictable results or when they rely on murky, 
undefined standards. I ultimately conclude, however, that the legislation designed 
to curb a court's ability to approve retention or severance programs is ill-advised 
largely because courts already apply rational factors that focus solely on whether 
the program is needed to help facilitate an efficient reorganization or liquidation. 
Indeed, the legislation would do little more than codify the factors courts already 
consider when approving these programs. Part III concludes that the legislation's 
proposed curbs on judicial discretion is problematic because these curbs likely will 
have negative unintended consequences. 
Part IV of the Essay suggests that one possible benefit of the increased 
legislative scrutiny of bankruptcy court's discretionary authority is the potential that 
the test proposed in the retention and severance program legislation could (with a 
few modifications) be usefully applied in a different bankruptcy context. 
Specifically, while courts reach rational, transparent results when approving 
retention or severance programs, it is harder to say that about court orders or 
opinions that have approved debtors' motions for authorization to pay the pre-
petition claims of "critical vendors" under the Doctrine of Necessity. Part IV 
briefly discusses criticisms of the Doctrine of Necessity and acknowledges the 
validity of some of those criticisms due to the inconsistent, unpredictable results 
reached by courts that have approved payments under the Doctrine of Necessity 
and because the "doctrine" itself is murky and largely undefined. Given this, I 
suggest that the curbs contained in this recent legislation, as slightly modified, could 
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help curtail what many critics suggest is unbridled judicial discretion to approve the 
arguably unwarranted payment of pre-petition claims. 
I. SEVERANCE AND RETENTION PROGRAMS 
A. In General 
Severance payments are generally a form of compensation offered after an 
employee is terminated and serves as replacement income for the employee while 
he or she searches for new employment. 3 Employers offer retention bonuses to their 
employees as a reward or incentive for remaining with a company during a period 
of downsizing, merger, or reorganization and to compensate them for any related 
opportunity costs and risks associated with remaining with the company.4 It is a 
common practice for employers to provide severance or retention payments to their 
employees. According to a recent survey, almost 80% of employers offer their 
employees some type of severance package. 5 Likewise, recent research indicates 
that more than three-fourths of companies in the ten major industry sectors6 
surveyed nationwide report the existence of some type of employee severance 
policy.7 Since severance pay is not mandated by federal law, it most frequently is 
provided voluntarily by employers.8 As a result, benefits provided by programs may 
vary dramatically from employer to employer.9 
3 See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1379 (7th ed. 1999). 
4 See Harvey L. Tepner, Turnarounds, Transparency and Accountability, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2002, 
at 10 n.2 (explaining purposes of employee retention program); William J. Kluwin, Arizona Wages or ERISA 
Benefits: The Treatment of Retention Bonuses and Severance Payments, 35 ARIZ. ATT'Y 32 (Mar. 1999) 
(same). 
5 See Lee Hecht Harrison, 2001 Severance Policies and Separation Benefits Study, (Oct. 24, 2002), at 
http://www.lhh.com/us/rsrchinfo/studies/sevsepbenefits.html (reporting statistics gathered by Lee Hecht 
Harrison, New Jersey based global career services company). 
6 See Patricia Rogers, From Work to Severance: Companies Walk a Fine Line with Layoffs- How to Let 
People Go Yet Help Them, Too, AUSTIN Bus. J., Aug. 10, 2001, available at 
http://austin.bizjournals.com/austinlstories /2001/08/13 /focus l.html (stating ten industries surveyed 
included manufacturing, service, health care, banking and fmancial, insurance, communications. chemical 
and pharmaceuticals, nonprofits, retail, energy and utilities). 
7 See id. See generally Human Resources Update, Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, available at 
http://www.ilchamber.org/er/ed!ER1080l.asp#HUMAN%20RESOURCES (Mar. 28, 2003) (discussing 
survey of 114 companies). 
8 Although the federal Fair Labor Standards Act does not mandate that employers provide severance pay, 
some state employment laws have such a mandate. In addition, certain regulated industries may have 
standards regarding severance payments. Similarly, private collective bargaining agreements may also 
outline standards that the employer must apply when deciding whether to provide severance benefits to 
covered employees. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Benefits Topics - Severance Pay, at 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/benefits-other/severancepay.htm; see also, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
INSTITUTE, INC., Benefits Alert Newsletter, at http://www.benefitsalert.com/newsletter/banl082202.shtml 
(explaining. severance pay not mandated by federal law). 
9 See ALEXANDER HAMILTON INSTITUTE, INC., supra note 8 (stating there is no "one-size-fits all" 
program). 
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While the type of severance and retention benefits program that businesses offer 
their employees varies significantly, the programs contain certain common aspects. 
Most employers appear to base some or all of their severance payments on the 
length of service the employee has with the company. 10 The most common 
employee service requirements range from six months to one year, and the typical 
formula used to calculate the severance amounts is a week of pay for each year of 
employee service. 11 Typical severance packages can range anywhere from $2,000 to 
$100,000, with "key" or highly compensated employees typically receiving larger 
packages with increased benefits. 12 
Employee retention bonuses vary more dramatically from company to company 
than do severance programs. Almost a third of all companies award employee 
bonuses that simply consist of an extended period of typical severance benefits. 
However, 28% use a more complicated formula based on a certain percentage of the 
employee salary, while the remaining 40% use an individualized formula based on 
factors such as length of service and position within the company. 13 
B. Retention Plans In Chapter 1 I Cases 
It has become common for debtors to seek court permission to give bonuses to 
key or "mission critical" employees to encourage them to remain with the company 
after the business files for bankruptcy. 14 Indeed, recent research suggests that almost 
half of all employers who file 1t petition for relief under chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code offer retention (also called "pay-to-stay") bonuses to ensure the 
continued service of their employees. 15 In addition, it is increasingly common for a 
company to offer selective retention bonuses to certain individuals if the company 
anticipates that it will file for bankruptcy. 16 Companies provide this benefit both to 
retain the employee and to help ensure the employee's loyalty during the company's 
10 See Rogers, supra note 6 (noting study findings). 
11 /d. (fmding median severance pay for officers, executives, and senior executives is two weeks' salary per 
year of service with company); see also Harrison, supra note 5 (observing higher-level executives more 
likely to negotiate severance pay individually in employment contracts). 
12 See Rogers, supra note 6 (quoting client services consultant). 
13 See Harrison, supra note 5. 
14 See Bethlehem Asks to Give, supra note 2 (discussing retention bonuses for Bethlehem Steel Corp. and 
LTV Corp. executives); Davis, supra note 2 (discussing argument debtor companies use to support retention 
bonuses); Speedo Maker Asks Bankruptcy Judge to Approve Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at C6 
(discussing retention bonuses for key employees ofWamaco Group); Chris Woodyard & Martin Kasindorf, 
Enron Execs Pocket Big Bonuses, USA TODAY, Feb. 1, 2002, at lB (showing debtor's motivation for giving 
retention bonuses). 
15 See Harrison, supra note 5. 
16 See Brooks, supra, note 1 (reporting Enron paid 500 of its employees $55 million in retention bonuses, 
while other employees who lost jobs in the wake of filing were told they would receive no more than $4,500 
in severance pay); Richard Korman & Tony Illia, Pay-to-Stay Plan Miff~ Employees, ENGINEERING NEWS-
REc., Jun. 18, 2001, available at http://www.construction.com/NewsCenter!Headlines/ENR/20010618b.jsp 
(stating selective retention bonuses are common in bankruptcy); Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, 
Enron Paid $55 Million for Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at Cl (observing Enron selectively paid 
about 500 employees retention bonuses while terminating 4000 other employees). 
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reorganization efforts. 17 However, the advent of high-profile mega-filings within the 
last two years 18 has brought into question the propriety of this practice. While 
critics object to both severance and retention programs, the most scrutiny, by far, 
has been on the judicial approval of key employee retention programs. As a result, 
companies who offer selective retention bonuses only to management (i.e. key 
employees) during their reorganizations increasingly have been criticized by the 
media, legislators, and the general public. 
II. JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF EMPLOYEE RETENTION AND SEVERANCE PROGRAMS 
Bankruptcy courts derive their authority to approve a debtor's request to 
maintain or implement a retention or severance program from section 363(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Section 363(b) gives a trustee or debtor-in-possession the 
authority to use, sell or lease, "other than in the ordinary course of business," 
property of the estate only upon court approval. 19 Bankruptcy judges traditionally 
employ a two-part test when asked to approve a proposed retention or severance 
program. First, the court looks at whether the debtor exercised proper business 
judgment in formulating the program, i.e., whether a sound business practice 
justifies the request. Second, the court considers whether the proposed program is 
fair and reasonable. 20 Given the discretionary nature of this test, the decision to 
approve these plans necessarily will vary according to the circumstances of each 
individual case.21 Courts typically interpret section 363(b) liberally in order to give 
bankruptcy judges "substantial freedom to tailor" orders to "meet differing 
circumstances," and to avoid shackling the judge "with unnecessary rigid rules. "22 
A. Rationale for Approving Retention or Severance Programs 
While the court is given wide flexibility under section 363(b) to determine 
when to approve requests to use, sell, or lease a debtor's property outside the 
17 See Harrison, supra note 5. 
18 See Carter Pate, The Phoenix Forecast: Bankntptcy Barometer 2003, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS 
LLP, Feb. 2003, available at http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/ThePhoenixForecast2003.pdf (reporting public 
company bankruptcy filings reached record high of 257 in 2001, but in 2002 number of filings declined to 
189); The Largest Bankruptcies i980-Present, NEW GENERATION RES., INC., Dec. 27, 2002 
(notwithstanding reduced number of bankruptcies, 2002 recorded largest bankruptcy in history with nine of 
fifteen largest bankruptcies - by amount of assets - since 1980 were filed in either 2001 or 2002, including 
filings by WorldCom, Inc., Enron, Conseco, Inc., Global Crossing Ltd., UAL Corp., at 
http://www.bankruptcydata.com/research/15 _largest.htm (parent of United Airlines), Pacific Gas & Electric, 
Adelphia Communications, and K.mart Corp.). 
19 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2000). 
20 See in re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 80 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (finding retention program to be fair 
and reasonable); in re Interco, Inc., 128 B.R. 229, 234 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (same). 
21 in re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. 147, 154 (D. Del. 1999) (preferring case-by-case 
analysis). 
22 Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (in re Lionel Corp.). 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(maintaining bankruptcy judge needs freedom to respond to particular facts of each case). 
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ordinary course of business, the debtor is required to articulate a business 
justification other than the "mere appeasement of major creditors"23 and must do 
more than just "follow the hue and cry of the most vocal special interest groups. "24 
Debtors often argue that they need to implement a retention program to appease key 
or mission-critical employees who might otherwise abandon the firm during the 
"thankless phase of rebuilding or dismantling an ailing enterprise. "25 In addition, 
debtors maintain that they need to implement the plan to assuage employees' fears 
that remaining with the company would either force them to work in a materially 
adverse work environment or would impose severe limitations on their career 
opportunities, or that the employees need a "cushion" to fall back on if they are 
terminated because of a failed reorganization.Z6 
Debtors also argue that implementing a retention program saves them the cost 
of having to replace key employees. They argue that the cost to the business if 
critical employees leave includes: the intangible loss of expertise or experience that 
employees take with them; the direct costs of paying headhunter fees to fmd and 
hire replacement workers; the need to pay hiring bonuses or relocation fees for new 
employees if old employees leave the company; and, the time-cost involved with 
bringing new employees up to speed within the business.27 These costs, debtors 
contend, can be avoided by offering retention or severance payments to entice key 
management to stay. 
Debtors also seek to implement or maintain severance or retention programs for 
equitable reasons. That is, debtors seek approval of these programs to reward 
employees for their hard work and dedication to the business.Z8 Likewise, debtors 
23 In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 175 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (requiring debtor to articulate 
some business justification). 
24 See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F. 2d at 1071 ("In fashioning its findings, a bankruptcy judge must not 
blindly follow the hue and cry of the most vocal special interest groups; rather, he should consider all salient 
factors pertaining to the proceeding."). 
25 See Brooks, supra, note I (explaining why Enron paid bonuses); see also In re Geneva Steel Co., 236 
B.R. 770, 772 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999) (noting uncontested evidence offered by debtor that talented job 
candidates often avoid working for chapter II debtors); In re Interco, Inc., 128 B.R. at 232 ("Participation in 
the Retention Plan will include only certain employees critical to the Debtors' ongoing operations ... [and] 
is expected to encourage the Critical Executives to remain with the Debtors."). 
26 See In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. at !50 ("[A]s a result of the large amount of 
publicity surrounding the Debtors' bankruptcy, employees are very insecure and morale is at a low."); In re 
Geneva Steel Co., 236 B.R. at 773 (arguing key employees needed "a cushion to fall back on in the event 
they were terminated"). 
27 See In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 79 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (stating cost of headhunting fees and 
additional expenses incurred in bringing new employees up to speed can equal upwards of entire year's 
salary for that employee); In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. at 150 (explaining in testimony 
"[d]cbtors would incur significant expenses associated with replacing employees including searching fees, 
hiring bonuses, relocation expenses and disruption at the store and corporate levels"); In re Geneva Steel 
Corp., 236 B.R. at 772 (offering debtor's uncontested evidence where executive search firms charge fees that 
may equal 30% of key employee's base salary and that business likely would be required to pay above 
market salaries to induce qualified candidates to accept employment offer with chapter II debtor). 
28 See In re Am. West Airlines, Inc., 171 B.R. 674, 678 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (seeking to reward 
"dedication of all of the employees of the debtor"); see also Jeffrey Krasner, Request for Bonuses Draws 
Fire .from Former Arthur D. Little Workers, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 2002, at Cl (debtor's counsel argued to 
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have asked judges to approve plans to institute a cash-based retention program 
where (as often is the case) the chapter 11 filing eliminated or rendered worthless 
the value of any long-term, stock-based compensation employees had bee~ 
promised pre-petition.29 Thus, debtors claim a judge should approve programs in 
order to compensate employees whose pre-petition compensation packages were 
effectively rendered valueless by the bankruptcy filing. 
Finally, debtors ask courts to approve retention or severance programs in order 
to maintain a continuity of management, which may be the only way to preserve the 
value of the business. 30 Especially during a chapter 11 reorganization, maintaining 
management stability is crucial to allay the concerns of existing creditors and to 
a.ttract potential post-petition lenders. Moreover, even if the debtor likely would be 
sold as a going concern, it is in the best interest of the estate to retain a stable 
management team to preserve "buyer confidence." Given this concern, when 
debtors know (or believe) that the fear of employee flight will erode a potential 
buyer's confidence in the business, they argue that sound business practices merit 
the approval of a retention or severance program to prevent the possible decrease in 
the sale price of the business.31 
B. Factors Courts Consider When Approving Plans 
Courts will generally approve key employee retention programs under section 
363(b) "if the Debtor has used proper business judgment in formulating the program 
and the court finds the program to be fair and reasonable. "32 Courts will rarely 
overturn a debtor's business decision "unless it is shown to be so manifestly 
unreasonable that it could not be based upon a sound business judgment, but only 
on bad faith, or whim or caprice. "33 The business judgment test that courts apply 
when deciding whether to approve a retention plan is derived largely from the 
court "[i]t is now timely and fair to reward the key employees who remained with the debtors [and] tirelessly 
played an indispensable role" in the successful sale process); WORLDCOM INC.: OK Sought for $25 
Million in Staff Retention Bonuses, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2002, Business, at 2 (quoting spokesman for debtor 
who said, "[t]he retention plan is an important element of our overall strategy to retain and reward 
emrloyees for their efforts during our reorganization"). . 
2 See In re Interco, Inc., 128 B.R. at 231 ("[S]tock-based, long-term incentive plans are widely used in the 
Debtors' industries as part of executive compensation packages ... however, no value currently exists in 
these plans."). 
30 See In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. at 82 (fmding particular employee was vital to successful 
reorganization); In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. at 150 (showing debtors thought keeping 
certain employees was necessary for reorganization). 
31 In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. at 81-82 (finding particular employee was vital to realizing best possible 
sale price); see also John Dempsey & Michael Siebenhaar, Bankruptcy Blues: Retaining Key Employees 
During a Financial Crisis, WORKSPAN, Feb. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 12188219 (discussing most 
bankrupt companies structure and implement retention plans for employees with eye towards goal of 
bankruptcy proceeding, whether it be obtaining highest liquidation value for remaining assets, or 
restructuring and obtaining highest resale value of all or portion of business). 
32 In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. at 80 (citing In re Interco Inc., 128 B.R. 229, 234 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) 
(internal citation omitted)). 
33 /d. (citing In re Logical Software, 66 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986)) (internal citations omitted). 
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business judgment rule that courts apply when deciding whether members of a 
corporate board of directors should be held liable for breaching their fiduciary duty 
of care. 
The corporate business judgment rule is designed to encourage directors to 
freely exercise their managerial discretion and to remove uncertainty from corporate 
transactions by avoiding an ex post appraisal of the their decisions.34 In general, 
unless it can be shown that the directors acted with the primary goal of 
accomplishing an impermissible purpose, decisions made by disinterested directors 
who used a rational, deliberately considered process to be informed or who made a 
good faith effort to advance the firm's interests typically will be shielded from 
liability.35 One question courts often ask when considering the rationality of the 
directors' deliberations is whether they sought external advice. Because of this, 
directors who are asked to consider whether a merger or takeover is financially 
"fair" to shareholders routinely seek the advice of investment bankers. Indeed, they 
rely on the advice they receive both to justify any merger decision the board 
approves and also to defend against potential liability if shareholders sue them for 
breaching their fiduciary duty of care.36 Similarly, it is not uncommon for the 
directors of companies who are seeking additional capital or are in merger 
discussions to obtain "solvency opinions" before committing to these potentially 
harmful transactions. 3 7 
Determining the reasonableness of the debtor's request to adopt a retention or 
severance program requires courts to analyze certain specific factors in addition to 
just simply looking at the parties' justifications for approval or rejection. While 
courts take into consideration the debtor's alleged need for the approval of bonus 
programs, they also consider the objections of the United States Trustee, individual 
creditors, the unsecured creditors' committee or bondholders' committee, and other 
interested parties (including unions). Though creditors' committees sometimes 
support a debtor's motion to implement a retention program,38 when they (or others) 
object they typically argue that the programs are unnecessary given the additional 
administrative expenses which necessarily will be incurred.39 Objectors specifically 
34 See Ajay Sports, Inc. v. Casazza, 1 P.3d 267, 275 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) ("The rule operates to preclude a court from imposing itself 
unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation."). 
35 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984). 
36 See William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How Fair are They and ff'hy We Should Do Nothing About 
It, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 523, 525 (1992) ("It is more useful to think of fairness opinions as assuring the 
continued application of the business judgment rule during an era when it has been under severe attack."). 
37 See Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc. (In re Autostyle Plastics, Inc.), 269 F.3d 726, 734 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing "solvency opinion" that induced sale of half of company's stock); In re Health co Int'l, Inc., 208 
B.R. 288, 299 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (discussing "solvency letter" prepared by appraisal firm during 
merger discussions). 
38 See In re Geneva Steel Co., 236 B.R. 770, 772 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999) (indicating unsecured creditors' 
committee and bondholders' committee both supported debtor's motion to approve retention program; 
however, objections were filed by United States Trustee and Steelworkers Union). 
39 See In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (noting objection by committee 
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argue that debtors should be forced to provide concrete evidence that ·key 
employees either have actually threatened to leave or are planning to leave before 
the court finds that the additional expense imposed by a retention or severance 
program are justified.40 
In determining the reasonableness of the debtor's request, courts consider how 
long the program requires employees to stay with the company. This likely stems 
from the fact that many retention plans offered by non-debtor businesses calculate 
the amount of retention bonuses based on the length of service the employee has 
with the company and also because requiring the employees to stay with the debtor 
for a longer period should help ensure the success of the reorganization. Thus, 
when considering whether an individual employee should receive a retention bonus 
from a debtor, courts justifiably consider how long the plan requires employees to 
remain with the company. There is no fixed time period courts have demanded, 
however, and courts have approved plans that require employees to stay for a fixed 
period of time ranging from six months through plan confirmation.41 
Judges often consider intangible factors, including employee sacrifice, when 
deciding whether the debtor exercised sound business judgment in adopting the 
plan. For example, courts consider whether employees were forced to take pay cuts 
or whether their benefits were decreased before the company filed for bankruptcy.42 
Courts also have considered whether employees have agreed (or will agree) to 
waive any potential claims they may have had against the debtor under a pre-
petition employment contract.43 Thus, one court evaluated whether employees 
arguing, "[d]ebtor had failed to substantiate why the estate should incur the potential additional 
administrative expense associated with the [Key Employee Retention Plan]"); see also Christopher Mele, 
Creditors Object to Exec Bonus Plan, JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester County, NY), July 5, 2002, at 89 
(reporting that creditors of New Power, a spin-off of Enron, objected to New Power's plan to award retention 
bonuses to executives as too costly); Krasner, supra note 28 (noting that Arthur D. Little's creditors objected 
to proposed employee bonuses because they constituted "empty" administrative expense and that debtor was 
seeking to unnecessarily reward employees for work already done). 
40 In re Aerovox. Inc., 269 B.R. at 76 ("[Creditors] expressed concern about binding the estate to potential 
administrative claims, without first providing any evidence that any 'key' personnel have either threatened to 
leave or are planni!lg to leave prior to the Debtor's submission of a prospective sale .... ") (internal citation 
omitted). 
41 See In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. 147, ISO (D. Del. 1999) (requiring employees to 
remain from time of approval of Motion to Approve Retention Plan through December 31, 1998, or 15 
months according to proposed plan); In re Interco Inc., 128 B.R. 229, 231 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (requiring 
emyloyees to remain for duration of chapter II proceeding as per proposed plan). 
4 See In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. at 78, 80 (noting that employee benefits were suspended prior to 
filing). 
43 See Enron Judge Grants 115 Employees Waivers on Bonuses, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 15, 2002. 
The article further explains that Enron asked the bankruptcy court to grant legal waivers to over 200 
employees that would exempt them from paying back any of the bonuses they received during the 90-days 
before the bankruptcy filing, i.e., the preference window provided in II U.S.C. § 547. Enron offered these 
waivers to the employees in exchange for their agreement to remain with the company until the end of 
August, and to waive any employment claims they may have had against Enron. The court approved the 
waivers for 115 non-insider employees, but not for the 85 employees that were considered "company 
insiders." Id.; LingLing Wei, Enron Judge Grants Bonus Waivers, ASSOC. PRESS ONLINE, Aug. 15, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 25139916 (same). 
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would waive claims based on a breach of a "change in control" agreement, under 
which they would have the right to be paid a multiple of their respective salaries if 
the debtor was sold.44 If the program proposes to make severance payments to 
compensate employees who are terminated before a chapter 11 plan is substantially 
consummated, courts are likely to require the program to mitigate those payments if 
the terminated employee obtains employment before the fixed period ends.45 
Courts also consider factors directly related to the employees themselves. For 
example, they consider whether there is an immediate danger of losing key 
employees because those employees have already been approached by competitors, 
or because the debtor has reason to believe that it is likely those employees are 
exploring other employment options.46 In addition, courts will likely explore the 
post-petition turnover rate of executives or wage employees.47 Courts also are likely 
to consider whether the proposed compensation program is sufficiently in line with 
wages paid to similarly situated employees48 and whether the plan takes a broad or 
narrow approach to employee compensation, i.e., whether the plan covers highly 
paid executives, or all employees and, if the plan covers only key or essential 
employees, how the plan defines "essential."49 Finally, courts consider the overall 
cost of the program that is submitted for approval, and are more likely to approve 
plans that appear reasonable and that contain costs that are transparent and fairly 
predictable. 50 
Since the business judgment test that courts apply when deciding whether 
debtors can use estate property is substantially similar to the corporate business 
judgment rule, bankruptcy courts also scrutinize the process that the board of 
directors used when they approved the retention or severance program. Thus, when 
deciding whether to approve a program, courts will consider how many times the 
board met to discuss the proposed program, the nature of those discussions, and 
44 See, e.g., In re Interco Inc., 128 B.R. at 232 (considering two executives' waiver of "change in control" 
claims under their current employment agreements in exchange for payments under court-approved retention 
plan). 
45 See In re Geneva Steel Co., 236 B.R. 770, 773-74 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999) (refusing to approve severance 
plan that would pay either six or nine months salary as severance payments unless plan reduced amount of 
pa.(;;ment payable if employees obtained other employment during relevant time period). 
6 See, e.g., In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. at 150 (citing debtor's employees were being 
targeted at unusually high rate by other organizations and competitors); In re Geneva Steel Co., 236 B.R. at 
772 (noting debtor "contends that there is a real danger that key employees will be enticed away by other 
companies if a retention plan is not implemented"). 
47 See In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. at 150 (asserting employee attrition rate of 20%); 
cf In re Geneva Steel, Co., 236 B.R. at 772 (considering anecdotal evidence of employee attrition based on 
debtors statement that "the loss of key employees often leads to the resignation of other key employees"). 
48 See In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. at 150 (relying on evaluation of third-party 
consultant in determining that compensation package was in line with others in industry); see also In re 
Geneva Steel, 236 B.R. 773-74. 
49 See In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. at 150; In reAm. West Airlines, Inc., 171 B.R. 
674, 677-78 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994). 
50 See, e.g., In re Interco Inc., 128 B.R. 229, 232 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (evaluating the threshold, target, 
and maximum amounts of the proposed plan). 
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whether the board hired an outside consultant to advise it on the need to implement 
the program. 51 
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO RETENTION AND SEVERANCE PROGRAMS 
A. Analysis of Legislation 
The recent highly publicized mega-filings and the perception that highly paid 
executives have been allowed to benefit at the expense of shareholders and 
employees have caused Congress to question the continued validity of allowing 
courts to exercise broad discretion when deciding whether to approve retention or 
severance bonuses. Congress recently considered legislation, the "Employee Abuse 
Protection Act of 2002" ("Act"), 52 that would place restrictions on a court's ability to 
approve retention or severance programs under section 363(b ). The last version of 
the Act that Congress considered53 focused on the payments of retention and 
severance bonuses to key employees and on the protection of lower-level rank and 
file employees and sought to limit the courts' discretion to approve key employee 
retention plans. 54 
Section 10455 of the Act would prohibit a court from approving retention 
programs that propose to transfer estate property to employees unless three specific 
factors are met.56 First, the court must find that "the transfer or obligation is 
51 See In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. at 150-51 (relying heavily on significant 
discussions among directors, and lengthy consultations with Ernst & Young in determining need for, and 
fashioning, a retention plan); see also In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 78--81 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) 
(reporting testimony by member of Aerovox board of directors that Board met five times before submitting 
retention plan proposal to court and had many serious discussions about cost-benefit analysis and indicating 
that this "established that the Board utilized sound business judgment."); In reAm. West Airlines, Inc., 171 
B.R. at 677 (finding significance in Board's use of outside professional services consultant in crafting 
emrloyee bonus plan). 
5 See Employee Abuse Protection Act of2002, S. 2798, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002) (stating purpose 
of proposed bill is "[t]o protect employees and retirees from corporate practices that deprive them of their 
earnings and retirement savings when a business files for bankruptcy"). 
53 See Employee Abuse Protection Act of 2002, S. 2798, 107th Cong. §§ 102-103 (2002) [hereinafter 
Original Act]. The original version of the bill was submitted to the Senate in July 2002 and contained a 
number of provisions that were not directly related to the issue of management compensation. For example, 
§§ 102 & 103 of the original proposed legislation addressed the "transparent characterization of transactions" 
and the "trustee as [a] good faith reliance purchaser for value," respectively. More specifically, § 102 was 
proposed as a reaffirmation of the court's ability to decide whether a sale of assets was in fact a disguised 
loan against corporate assets, and its subsequent ability to re-characterize the sale as an avoidable secured 
transaction. In addition, § I 03 extended to trustees the power to set aside certain liens or security interests. 
!d. 
54 See Employee Abuse Protection Act of 2002, S. 2798, 107th Cong. (2002) (amended) [hereinafter 
Amended Act]. 
55 The original proposed bill lists the "Limitation on Retention Bonuses, Severance Pay, and Certain Other 
Payments" at§ 104. However, the newest amended version of this bill lists this section as"§ 3." This Essay 
will refer to the numbered sections of the original proposed bill. 
56 See Amended Act, supra note 54, § 3, stating: 
[T]here shall neither be allowed, nor paid ... a transfer made to ... an insider of the 
debtor for the purpose of inducing such a person to remain with the debtor's business, 
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essential to the retention of the person."57 Next, the court must not only determine 
that the employee would have left but for the retention bonus, but must also 
determine that "the services provided by [that] person are essential to the survival of 
the business."58 Finally, the court would not be permitted to approve a retention 
bonus payment to a debtor's employee that is greater than 10 times the mean 
payments to non-management employees during the same calendar year.59 If no 
bonuses were paid to non-management employees during that year, then the court 
could approve payments only if the payments did not exceed twenty-five percent of 
the amount of payments given to that person during the preceding calendar year.60 
Section 104 also regulates a debtor's ability to implement a post-petition 
severance program. This section prohibits courts from approving severance 
payments unless two conditions are met. First, the payment must be made as part of 
a program that is applicable to all full-time employees.61 Second, the amount of the 
payment to any key employee must not exceed ten times the mean severance pay 
given to non-management employees during the same calendar year.62 
B. Justifications for Curtailing Judicial Discretion 
Legislators, and some academic commentators, seem highly distrustful of 
bankruptcy judges' ability to properly exercise judicial discretion. Indeed, the 
means-testing bankruptcy legislation that has been considered by Congress for the 
I d. 
absent a finding by the court based on evidence in the record [supporting the factors set 
forth in this Act]. 
57 See Original Act, supra note 53, § 104. The original version of the bill included requirement that 
employee "has a bona fide job offer from another business at same or greater rate of compensation." !d. 
5 See Amended Act, supra note 54, § 3. 
59 Amended Act, supra note 54, § 3 states, in pertinent part: 
I d. 
(T]he amount of the transfer made to, or obligation incurred for the benefit of, the 
person [may not be] greater than an amount equal to 10 times the amount of the mean 
transfer or obligation of a similar kind given to non-management employees for any 
purpose during the calendar year in which the transfer is made or the obligation is 
incurred .... 
60 Amended Act, supra note 54, § 3 provides, in pertinent part: 
I d. 
[I]f no such similar transfers were made to, or incurred for the benefit of, such non-
management employees during such calendar year, the amount of the transfer or 
obligation is not greater than an amount equal to 25 percent of the amount of any 
similar transfer of obligation made to or incurred for the benefit of such insider for any 
purpose during the calendar year before the year in which such transfer is made or 
obligation is incurred .... 
61 !d. ("(T]he payment [must be] part of a program that is generally applicable to all full-time 
emrloyees. "). 
6 ld. ("(T]he amount ofthe payment is not greater than 10 times the amount of the mean severance pay 
given to non-management employees during the calendar year in which the payment is made."). Also, 
section 104 prohibits any payments by debtor to officers, managers or consultants hired post-petition, and 
instructs court to view these payments as necessarily "outside the ordinary course of business." !d. 
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last 5 years, 63 is specifically designed to restrict judges' ability to determine whether 
a consumer debtor should be allowed relief under chapter 7 of the Code. This and 
other legislation is essentially a "contest over the institutional choice between 
markets, and judges, fought out over crystalline versus muddy rules."64 Congress 
and other bankruptcy critics seem to prefer clear, inflexible "crystalline" rules that 
severely limit a court's ability to make fact-based decisions over flexible "muddy" 
rules that give courts considerably more discretion.65 Because section 363 of the 
Code does not list specific factors courts must consider when deciding whether to 
approve a retention or severance program, Congress not surprisingly is now 
attempting to prevent judges from relying on that Code provision when they are 
asked to approve such programs. 
Though legislators and commentators are rarely this blunt, their desire to curb 
judicial discretion seems to stem from a belief that bankruptcy judges either are 
biased in favor of debtors, 66 are stupid, or are incapable of exercising discretion in a 
principled or transparent fashion.67 It is, of course, virtually impossible to refute (or 
support) an allegation that judges are biased or stupid absent a large-scale empirical 
study of bankruptcy judges and their decisions. It is reasonable to assume, 
however, that most trial-level judges (bankruptcy judges included) are probably 
more interested in moving their dockets and trying to reach the "right" decision than 
they are in trying to advance some political agenda.68 While the fact that courts are 
63 The means-testing legislation that has been introduced in Congress for the last several years seeks to 
replace the current § 707(b) substantial abuse standard with a more rigid formula to determine when and 
how individual debtors must repay creditors. See Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The 
Problem of Means, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407, 411 (2002) (arguing in part that proposed means 
tests hurts not only true abusers but extends to hurt legitimate and honest debtors as well). The "means-test" 
formula proposes a complex two-step test that arguably has the effect of restricting access to bankruptcy 
relief through the imposition of this strict rule. See id. at 411, 425-26. One of the more controversial aspects 
of the rigid "means test" is that it requires no threshold median income test. Thus, because this test is applied 
to debtors across the board without considering the debtor's income, the test applies even to those debtors 
who have no realistic possibility of repaying their creditors. See id. at 434-45. 
64 Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. 
L. REv. 559, 560 (2001) (citation omitted). 
65 !d. 
66 See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How do Judges Maximize? (The Same way Everybody 
Else Does - Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 96 (2002) 
(conceding judges like other political actors bring their beliefs, ideologies, biases and constituencies to 
bench but rejecting notion judges hold single political belief that would cause them to reach policy-based 
results); cf Greg Zipes, Securitization: Challenges in the Age of LTV Steel Co., Inc., 2002 ANN. SURV. 
BANKR. L. 105 (2002) ("Bankruptcy judges try to give debtors every advantage because they may be 
criticized if reorganization case were to fail." (citing Lynn LoPucki & Sara Kalin, The Failure of Public 
Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom." 54 
V AND. L. REV. 231, 266 (2000))). 
67 See Janger, supra note 64, at 575 (suggesting critics view judges as incompetent); cf Robert E. Scott, 
The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847 (2000) (arguing for more 
formalistic interpretation of contracts to limit judicial discretion); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 74 (2000) (suggesting judicial incompetence to interpret statutes). 
68 See Bainbridge, supra note 66, at 96 (arguing most trial court judges are overworked and concerned 
with getting through caseloads and avoiding criticisms of decisions). Since bankruptcy judges in some 
districts face severe time constraints because of their over-crowded dockets, see Richard B. Schmitt & 
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allowed to exercise wide discretion in resolving some bankruptcy disputes may 
cause some bankruptcy decisions to appear unpredictable or irrational69 this is not 
true with decisions that approve retention or severance programs since, as discussed 
earlier, bankruptcy courts typically consider the same factors when deciding to 
approve these programs. 
Even if judges occasionally reach the wrong conclusion when they exercise 
their discretion based on the relatively flexible business judgment test, there 
nonetheless is a very good reason to give judges discretion and flexibility when they 
evaluate retention or severance programs. If the debtor and the employees covered 
by the retention program understand that a bankruptcy court has the authority to 
examine the transaction, if a party in interest objects to the program, they will be 
forced to avert to that possibility during negotiation.7° Forcing the parties ex ante to 
consider the possibility that a court will refuse to implement the program should 
help to avoid overreaching by the employees who are negotiating the terms of the 
program and should cause the debtor's board of directors to critically examine the 
Michael Orey, Courts Compete for High-Profile Bankruptcies, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2001, at Bl (noting 
more popular bankruptcy venues - such as Delaware, which has snagged more than 50% of all corporate 
bankruptcies since 1996 - have experienced over-crowding which has led to delays), and they - unlike 
federal district court judges - do not have lifetime tenure, they are probably more concerned about 
perception that they get it "right" since they must be periodically reviewed before they are reappointed; see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (stating bankruptcy judges are appointed by judges of Court of Appeals for 
fourteen year term). Thus, unless critics can demonstrate all bankruptcy judges, district court judges who 
review their decisions on appeal, and appellate judges who decide whether they will be reappointed are all 
pro-debtor, the argument that bankruptcy judges cannot be trusted to exercise discretion because they have 
pro-debtor bias is a hollow one indeed. 
69 For example, academic and non-academic commentators often criticize courts' decisions to use their 
equitable powers under section 105 to stay claims against or otherwise grant injunctive relief to non-debtors 
and also criticize courts who approve plans releasing or extinguishing creditors' claims against non-debtor 
third-parties without creditor consent. See Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: 
A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 923, 
951 ( 1997); Howard C. Buschmann III & Sean P. Madden, The Power and Propriety of Bankruptcy Court 
Intervention in Actions Between Non-debtors, 47 Bus. LAW. 913 (1992); Peter E. Meltzer, Getting out of 
Jail Free: Can the Bankruptcy Process be Used to Release Non-Debtor Parties, 17 AM. BANKR. L. J. 1 
(Winter 1997). Compare In re PWS Holding Corp., 303 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding plan can release 
claims against non-debtor parties) with In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d. 1394 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating plan of 
reorganization releasing claims of nondebtors could not be approved). Likewise, notwithstanding the recent 
Supreme Court opinion in Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 536 U.S. 434 
(1999), commentators have noted that it is still difficult to determine when a court will exercise its authority 
to approve plans violating absolute priority rule. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson & Jack F. Williams, The 
Truth About the New Value Exception to Bankruptcy's Absolute Priority Rule, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1303, 
1305 (2000) (stating "Supreme Court's quasi-resolution of new-value controversy [in LaSalle] is unworkable 
and absurd"). Compare In re Global Ocean Carriers, Ltd., 251 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (denying 
confirmation of chapter 11 debtor's plan that violated absolute priority rule) with In re Zenith Electronics, 
Corp., 241 B.R. 92 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (confirming chapter 11 plan and finding "no violation" of absolute 
priority rule where debtor's single largest creditor was given all of debtor's stock in exchange for forgiveness 
of $200 million of secured debt). Similarly, commentators have noted the "chaotic and random state of case 
law" on the topic of when a plan can be said to discriminate unfairly with respect to a nonconsenting class. 
Bruce Markell, Slouching Toward Fairness: A Reply to the ABCNY's Proposal on Unfair Discrimination, 58 
Bus. LAW. 109 (Nov. 2002). 
70 See Janger, supra note 64, at 585. 
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program before recommending its approval. Likewise, allowing judges to exercise 
discretion when reviewing a retention or severance program should deter creditors 
from objecting to a program that will lead to a more efficient reorganization 
because of their knowledge that the court can examine both the reasonableness of 
the program and the reasonableness of the creditors' objections to the program.71 
C. Critique of Legislation 
When courts are asked to approve an employee retention or severance program, 
they necessarily must make highly fact and industry-specific analyses. The Act, 
like the means-testing bankruptcy legislation, is designed to create a "one-size-fits-
all" test that restricts a bankruptcy court's ability to exercise discretion when 
deciding whether to approve a retention or severance program. In theory, this could 
be viewed as beneficial since the Act could provide clear statutory guidance for 
judges who analyze these types of bonus programs. However, this particular Act 
simply is not necessary. 
Unlike criticisms made when bankruptcy judges rely on section 105 of the Code 
to permit the debtor to engage in acts not otherwise permitted by a specific 
provision of the Code,72 courts approve retention or severance plans pursuant to 
section 363(b) and this section explicitly permits courts to allow debtors to use 
estate property. Moreover, the "one-size-fits-all" test suggested by the Act is 
unwarranted since, pursuant to section 363(b), judges already apply consistent (and 
essentially transparent) factors when they evaluate the business judgment the debtor 
exercised in proposing the plan. Bankruptcy courts who are asked to make 
decisions based on section 363(b) of the Code not only can rely on bankruptcy court 
precedent, but can also rely on tests developed by state and federal judges who have 
been asked to determine whether the business judgment rule shields directors from 
liability based on an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, while in theory 
allowing courts to exercise unfettered discretion leads to unpredictable results, this 
has generally not occurred when courts have approved retention or severance 
programs under section 363 because courts who have evaluated these programs 
apply factors that appear to be accepted by bankruptcy judges across the country. 
The only factors the Act adds to those that courts already consider are the 
numerical caps. Bankruptcy courts have not placed rigid caps on the amount of 
payments that employees can receive under retention or severance programs. 
Instead, they attempt to ensure that the benefits the programs pay are tied to the 
71 Moreover, it simply is unreasonable to expect judges will get it right each time. Though most 
bankruptcy judges were experienced bankruptcy or corporate law practitioners before they joined the bench, 
it is mere folly to suggest they have time to dissect a debtor's proposed retention or severance program or 
thafthey have time to independently determine affected employees' likely employment possibilities in the 
market. See Bainbridge, supra note 66, at 91 (suggesting academic criticisms of judicial opinions unfairly 
hold judges to "Herculean model" expecting judge to get it right each time and assuming judge has full 
information and full knowledge). 
72 See supra note 69. 
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"success" of the organization73 and that those payments are consistent with wages 
paid in the market by evaluating the wages that similarly-situated employees 
receive from peer companies. 74 Although the Act's reliance on numerical caps may 
help to assuage the symbolic concern that management employees are not receiving 
a disproportionate amount of the bonuses proposed to be paid by the program, the 
caps could prevent a court from approving a plan that is necessary to the debtor's 
reorganization. For example, if a management employee agreed to take a pay cut in 
the calendar year that preceded the bankruptcy filing in order to help keep the 
business afloat, capping the employee's bonus at 25% of the payments the person 
received during that period would not be fair, would not be justified, and most 
likely would force the employee to accept wages that are lower than the employee 
could receive in the market. Likewise, though it is a good sound bite to say that 
management employees can receive no more than 10 times the mean payments 
given to non-management employees, if a particular key employee demands wages 
which are consistent with those paid to like employees in similar industries (but 
which exceed the proposed cap), it would potentially harm the company's 
reorganization or liquidation efforts to prevent a court from approving the payment. 
In short, if the debtor can prove that the employee is key, that the wages demanded 
are consistent with those paid in the market, and that the debtor needs the employee 
to effectively reorganize (or be sold as a going concern), the court should have the 
discretion to approve the payments notwithstanding the appearance that a highly-
paid employee is being allowed to profit at the expense of lower wage employees 
and creditors. 
IV. POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF LEGISLATION 
One potential benefit of the legislation is that it could, with a few modifications, 
be used to give bankruptcy courts a clear standard and list of factors to apply when 
they are asked to approve a debtor's request to pay an unsecured creditor's pre-
petition claims before plan confirmation under the Doctrine of Necessity. Courts 
rely on section 105 of the Code to approve the payment of pre-petition obligations 
outside of the priority scheme provided in section 507 of the Code.75 Section 105 
empowers the court to issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. 76 Courts have relied on this 
provision to authorize numerous kinds of creditor payments the most common (and 
least controversial) being the payment of pre-petition unsecured employee wage 
claims.77 
73 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
74 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
75 See, e.g., In re Wehrenberg, 260 B.R. 468 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2001); In re Just For Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 
821,824-25 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In re Gulf Air Inc., 112 B.R. 152 (Bankr. W.O. La. 1989). 
76 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000). 
77 Courts typically that hold pre-petition employee wage and benefit claims, which are entitled to priority 
of payment under II U.S.C. § 507(a)(3), are payable before other creditor claims under authority of section 
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In principle, payments should be made only if the debtor shows that paying a 
creditor's pre-petition claim is in the best interest of all creditors and the health of 
the debtor in general. 78 To overcome the Bankruptcy Code's requirement that the 
claims of similarly situated creditors receive equal treatment, the debtor must show 
the court that paying specific pre-petition claims is somehow "necessary" to an 
effective reorganization. 79 Frequently, courts are asked to allow debtors to make 
post-petition payments in "first-day orders. "80 Indeed, these motions have been filed 
in each of the most recent mega-corporate filings and courts have approved 
payments in each of these cases. 81 
A court in the Northem District of Texas recently set forth a three-part test to 
determine whether post-petition payments made pursuant to the doctrine of 
necessity are acceptable. In In re CoServ, 82 the court suggested that debtors must 
show that, for one reason or another, the creditor is virtually indispensable to the 
profitable operation or preservation of the estate. 83 A showing that the vendor is the 
sole source for an item, or the only one who could deliver the item by the debtor's 
deadline, would seem to satisfy this first requirement. 84 The debtor must also 
demonstrate that failing to pay the claim will cause a harm, or eliminate an 
105. See In re Equalnet Communications Corp., 258 B.R. 368 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000); In re Gulf Air, Inc., 
112 B.R. 152 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989) (authorizing immediate payment of employee wage and benefit claims 
under § 105); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (authorizing Eastern 
Airlines, Inc. to pay its employees pre-petition wage, salary, medical benefit, and business expense claims); 
In re Chateaugay Corp., 80 B.R. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (approving bankruptcy court order for payment of 
pre-petition employee wage, salary, reimbursement, and workers' compensation claims). Approving the 
claims becomes somewhat more controversial, however, when employees seek payments exceeding priority 
limit. 
78 See JoAnn J. Brighton, The Doctrine of Necessity: Is it Really Necessary?, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
107 (2000); Russell A. Eisenberg and Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and its Parameters, 73 
MARQ. L. REV. I (1989). 
79 See JoAnn J. Brighton, The Doctrine of Necessity: Is it Really Necessary?, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
107 (2000); Russell A. Eisenberg and Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and its Parameters, 73 
MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
80 See Patricia L. Barsalou and Zack Mosner, Preferential First-day Orders: Same Question, Different 
Look, AM. BANKR. lNST. J., Feb. 2003, at 8; Bruce H. White and William L. Medford, The Doctrine of 
Necessity and Critical Trade Vendors: The Impracticality of Maintaining Post-petition Business Relations in 
Mefa-cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2002, at 137. 
8 See Motion of the Debtors Pursuant to § l05(a) of the Bankruptcy Code for Authorization to Pay Pre-
petition Claims of Critical Vendors, available at http://www.elawforworldcom.com/WorldComdefault.asp 
(seeking authority for WorldCom to pay critical vendor claims); Motion of the Debtors Pursuant to Sections 
105 and 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to Pay Pre-petition Wages, Compensation and Employee Benefits, 
available at http://www.elawforworldcom.com/WorldComdefault.asp (seeking authority to pay wage 
claims, including deferred compensation obligations, relocation obligations, tuition obligations, and savings 
plan obligations). Similar motions were filed in the Enron and Kmart filings. See Motion f9r Authorization 
to Pay Pre-petition Claims of Critical Vendors, available at http:// www.elaw4enron.com/default.asp; 
Motion of the Debtors for Authority to Pay Prepetition Employee Compensation, Benefits, Reimbursable 
Business Expenses and Related Administrative Costs, available at http:// www.elaw4enron.com/default.asp; 
see also In re Kmart Corp. et a!., Chapter 11, Case No. 02-B-02474 (SPS) (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan 25, 2002) 
and (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002). 
82 In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
83 !d. at 498. 
84 See id. 
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economic advantage, that is disproportionate to the amount of the claim.85 Finally, 
the debtor must establish that there is no practical or legal alternative to paying the 
claim. 86 Thus, if the debtor cannot obtain the goods and services by giving a creditor 
a deposit or by paying COD, this last requirement also should be satisfied. If the 
debtor can prove all three of these conditions (typically by either expert testimony 
from witnesses in the industry, or by the debtor or vendor) by a preponderance of 
evidence, the CoServ court concluded that the claim presumably should be deemed 
"necessary" and, thus, allowed. 87 
Despite the apparent clarity of the CoServ opinion, there is wide discrepancy 
among the Circuits as to whether courts have the authority to approve the payment 
of any pre-petition unsecured claim prior to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan and 
those who have approved such payments have struggled when deciding how to 
define the standard lower courts should apply when deciding whether to approve 
these payments.88 This, not surprisingly, has caused bankruptcy and district courts 
to reach wildly divergent results when deciding whether to authorize these 
payments. 89 Though courts suggest that they narrowly apply the rule,90 
commentators have bitterly criticized courts' reliance on the "doctrine of 
necessity.'r91 Specifically, critics argue that approving a request to pay a pre-petition 
claim (1) is not specifically authorized by the Bankruptcy Code,92 (2) is inconsistent 
85 !d. 
86 !d. at 499. 
87 !d. at 498. 
88 For example, the Third Circuit has detennined "the sine qua non for the application of the 'necessity of 
payment' doctrine is the possibility that the creditor will employ an immediate economic sanction, failing 
such payment." Matter ofLehigh & N.E. Ry. Co., 657 F.2d. 570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981). However, the First 
Circuit has defined the standard simply as "indispensably necessary." In re Boston and Maine Corp., 634 
F.2d. 1539 (1st Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit has declined to authorize the payment of pre-petition claims 
with post-petition funds under§ 105. See In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc., 4 F.3d 1329, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1993). 
89 Compare In re Just for Feet, Inc. 242 B.R. 821, 826 (D. Del. 1999) (authorizing payment of pre-petition 
claims to footwear and athletic apparel vendors as "critical" to Just for Feet's reorganization because officers 
of corporation testified it would not survive), and In re NVR, L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1992) ( detennining court may in fact authorize payment pre-petition of claims upon showing of "substantial 
necessity" by proponent of payment), and In re Eagle-Pitcher Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 1021, 1023 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1991) (holding payment must be "necessary to avert serious threats to [c]hapter 11 process."), with In 
re FCX, Inc., 60 B.R. 405, 410 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (holding bankruptcy court improperly subordinated claims 
by approving payment of pre-petition payroll claims). 
90 See In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. at 491 ("The court does not disagree that it can allow Debtors to pay 
prepetition debt [under Doctrine of Necessity and] other than pursuant to plan-but holds it may do so only 
under extraordinary circumstances."). 
91 See, e.g., Patricia L. Barsalou & Zack Mosner, Preferential First-Day Orders: Same Question, Different 
Look, AM. BANKR. lNST. J., Feb. 2003, at 8 (detennining best way to bring Congress' attention to need for 
some type of specific and codified doctrine of necessity is for courts to follow section 105- and not apply 
common law doctrine of necessity - and allow terribly drastic results. Also, authors state "routine entry of 
preferential orders [such as those entered by court according to doctrine of necessity] ... allows debtors, 
courts, and certain well-positioned creditors ... to act as though the Code has already been amended, while 
other parties, including tax priority creditors [and those creditors without sufficient notice] ... are relegated 
to the existing Code."); Charles Jordan Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75, 115 (1991) (urging "judges to adopt a unifonn rule refusing to 
ap~rove the preferential treatment of any prepetition claims."). 
2 See, e.g., JoAnn J. Brighton, The Doctrine of Necessity: Is it Really Necessary?, 10 J. BANKR. L. & 
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with the priority scheme established in section 507 of the Code,93 and (3) allows 
courts to approve payments without first providing a clear and transparent definition 
for when a creditor is "critical" or when a payment is "necessary."94 Most academic 
commentators suggest that courts should not have the authority to approve the pre-
confirmation payment of an unsecured creditor's pre-petition claim. Other 
commentators have argued that, rather than revising the Code to eliminate the 
ability of courts to approve critical vendor motions, Congress should instead codify 
the doctrine of necessity. 95 
The Act, though not applicable to the pre-confirmation payment of pre-petition 
claims, could help respond to the criticisms of the continued applicability of the 
doctrine of necessity by clarifying when (if ever) it is appropriate to pay creditors 
outside the statutorily established priority scheme. That is, applying the standards 
contained in the Act would force courts to condition the approval of the payment of 
a pre-petition unsecured claim on a finding that paying the claim before other 
similarly ranked claims is crucial to the creditor's willingness to continue to do 
business with the debtor. Assuming the court makes that finding, it should then ask 
whether the creditor's services are essential to the survival of the business. Finally, 
because of the risk that paying pre-petition unsecured claims outside of the normal 
priority scheme may cause other creditors to receive less than their pro rata share in 
the bankruptcy distribution, courts should compare the amount of the proposed 
payment to the likely amount of funds available to pay other similarly ranked 
claims and should, if necessary, place a cap on the amount ofpayments pre-petition 
creditors can receive.96 In formulating such a cap, the court should consider the 
amount of payments the creditor received pre-petition and the amount of pre-
petition payments debtors made to creditors who are not being viewed as "critical 
vendors." 
PRAC. 107, 107-08 (Dec./Jan 2000) ("Interestingly, there is no reference to the doctrine of necessity in the 
Code .... Rather, the doctrine of necessity is well established as a common law doctrine only."); Helen H. 
Han, Testing the Limits of Judicial Discretion in Chapter 11: The Doctrine of Necessity and Third Party 
Releases, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 551, 557 ("[N]o Code provision specifically authorizes its use."). 
93 See Brighton, supra note 92, at 116 ("Congress had a very specific scheme concerning the priority of 
payments under the Code when it was adopted ... [t]o preserve integrity of the Code and its uniform 
ap~lication, Courts should tread very lightly in using any power which overrides the intent of Congress."). 
4 See Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and its Parameters, 73 
MARQ. L. REv. I (1989) {"To no surprise, there is no consensus as to what factors or combination of factors 
must be present for the doctrine to be applied."); cf Bruce H. White & William L. Medford, The Doctrine of 
Necessity and Critical Trade Vendors: The Impracticality of Maintaining Post-petition Business Relations in 
Mega-cases, Practice & Procedure, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2002, at 37 (recognizing "problem of proof' 
associated with courts granting pre-petition claims under doctrine of necessity as part of first-day orders). 
95 See White, supra note 94, at 37. 
96 A numerical cap would be appropriate when deciding whether to pay pre-petition claims ahead of other 
similarly-situated claims because such payments are inconsistent with the Code's priority scheme. In 
contrast, imposing caps on the amounts of retention or severance payments debtor could pay would not be 
appropriate because those payments would be based on service the employee provided to the debtor post-
petition, and thus, theoretically would be administrative expenses which would be entitled to first priority 
payment assuming the estate is administratively solvent. See II U.S.C. § 503{b) ("After notice and hearing, 
there shall be allowed administrative expenses, other than claims allowed under§ 502(1) of this title"). 
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CONCLUSION 
Though arguing for less judicial discretion is now in vogue, and Congress has 
spent several years attempting to curtail the discretion of bankruptcy judges, there 
simply is no reason to legislatively dictate when bankruptcy courts can approve 
employee retention or severance programs. There is nothing unusual about 
employer retention or severance programs, as they are widely offered by U.S. 
businesses. Though creditors (and especially unions) understandably object when 
debtors seek to implement a key-employee retention or severance program, judicial 
decisions approving these programs have adopted generally consistent factors that 
focus on whether the programs provide a benefit to the estate. If bankruptcy courts 
had exercised their discretion in a haphazard, unpredictable fashion or had not 
required debtors to demonstrate that the payments provide a valuable benefit to the 
estate, Congress would be justified in legislatively dictating when such payments 
should be allowed. 
Rather than viewing payments to highly paid employees in terms of justice or 
injustice to lower paid workers, courts should ask whether the payment benefits the 
estate overall. If the answer is yes, then the court should be allowed to exercise its 
judgment to determine whether to approve the request to implement the retention or 
severance program. Certainly, highly paid executives should not be allowed to 
plunder a bankruptcy estate by demanding that they receive a large retention or 
severance bonus with no requirement that they provide services to the estate in an 
amount roughly commensurate with the payments. However, if the debtor company 
needs the services of the executives to have an effective reorganization (or orderly 
liquidation), and the executives demand market-based retention or severance 
payments as a condition of remaining with the company, courts should be allowed 
to approve these payments without being handcuffed by a rigid, inflexible rule. 
